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The Risk of Regulatory Arbitrage: A 
Response to Securities Regulation in 
Virtual Space 
Wendy Gerwick Couture* 
Abstract 
In Securities Regulation in Virtual Space, Eric. C. Chaffee 
explores the potential applicability of the securities laws to virtual 
transactions based on virtual activity and argues that, although 
many of these transactions likely qualify as “investment contracts” 
under S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., they should be excluded under 
the context clause because, among other reasons, application of the 
securities laws would stifle creativity within this innovative space. 
This Response proposes a reframing of the Howey test as a 
response to the risk of regulatory arbitrage, argues that the context 
clause should only exclude transactions that do not pose such a 
risk, contends that transactions in virtual space do pose a risk of 
regulatory arbitrage, and thus concludes that these transactions 
should not be excluded from the securities laws. In recognition of 
Professor Chaffee’s compelling argument that securities regulation 
would hinder creativity within this burgeoning area, this 
Response argues for a new exemption from registration that would 
further the policy goals of the securities laws while not stifling 
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I am delighted to have this opportunity to respond briefly to 
Eric C. Chaffee’s thought-provoking article, Securities Regulation 
in Virtual Space.1 Professor Chaffee’s article explores the 
potential applicability of the securities laws to virtual 
transactions based on virtual activity and argues that, although 
many of these transactions likely qualify as “investment 
contracts” under S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co.,2 they should be 
excluded under the context clause3 because, among other reasons, 
application of the securities laws would stifle creativity within 
this innovative space. 
My response proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I discuss four 
unique contributions that Professor Chaffee’s article makes to the 
extant literature.4 In Part II, I propose a reframing of the Howey 
test and the context clause as a response to the risk of regulatory 
arbitrage.5 I argue that Howey’s broad definition of “investment 
                                                                                                     
 1.  Eric C. Chaffee, Securities Regulation in Virtual Space, 74 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1387 (2017). 
 2.  S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). 
 3.  15 U.S.C. § 77b(a) (prefacing the definitions with the clause “unless the 
context otherwise requires”); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (same). 
 4.  See infra Part I. 
 5.  See infra Part II. 
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contract” operates to prevent parties from structuring 
transactions to evade the securities laws and that the context 
clause operates as a release valve to the extent the transaction at 
issue does not pose a risk of regulatory arbitrage. In Part III, I 
apply this new perspective on the intersection of the Howey test 
and the context clause to virtual transactions based on virtual 
activity.6 I contend that, because these transactions pose a risk of 
regulatory arbitrage, they should not be excluded by the context 
clause. Finally, in response to Professor Chaffee’s compelling 
argument that securities regulation would hinder creativity 
within this burgeoning area, I argue that a better response is to 
enact a new exemption from registration that would further the 
policy goals of the securities laws while not stifling innovation in 
virtual space.7 
I. Unique Contributions of Securities Regulation in 
Virtual Space 
Professor Chaffee’s article makes several unique 
contributions. First, he creates a new taxonomy for securities 
transactions: (1) real-world transactions based on real-world 
activity; (2) real-world transactions based on virtual activity; (3) 
virtual transactions based on real-world activity; and (4) virtual 
transactions based on virtual activity.8 As explained by Professor 
Chaffee, the potential applicability of securities regulation differs 
in each context, and I anticipate that future scholars and courts 
will find this taxonomy useful when analyzing novel transactions. 
Second, Professor Chaffee provides the first in-depth 
discussion of transactions within the fourth category of his 
taxonomy: virtual transactions based on virtual activity.9 After 
providing a primer on video games, virtual worlds, virtual reality, 
                                                                                                     
 6.  See infra Part III. 
 7.  See id. 
 8.  Chaffee, supra note 1, at 1419.   
 9.  Id. at 1422. 
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and augmented reality, he gives examples of transactions that 
already fall within this category, such as securities exchanges 
that operate in the online virtual world of Second Life, and 
recognizes the potential future growth of this type of virtual 
transaction.10 
Third, Professor Chaffee applies the Howey test11 for 
“investment contracts,”12 which are a subset of the securities 
regulated by the federal securities laws, to virtual transactions 
based on virtual activity, concluding that many of these 
transactions likely qualify as investment contracts.13 He also 
recognizes that these transactions could be structured to fall 
outside the scope of the Howey test, such as by eliminating the 
potential for real world currency to be exchanged for virtual 
currency, but argues that these workarounds the Howey test 
would limit innovation.14 
Finally, applying an expansive interpretation of the prefatory 
clause “unless the context otherwise requires,”15 Professor 
Chaffee argues that virtual transactions based on virtual activity 
should be excluded from the definition of “security,” despite their 
likely satisfaction of the Howey test.16 Professor Chaffee contends 
that the policy reasons for excluding these transactions from the 
scope of securities regulation outweigh the policy reasons for 
including them.17 Professor Chaffee argues that it would exceed 
Congressional intent to apply the securities laws to transactions 
without a substantial link to the real world;18 that extending the 
reach of the federal securities laws to these transactions, where 
“doubt exists as to whether Congress has exercised its power” to 
                                                                                                     
 10.  Id. at 1394–98 & 1422–25 
 11.  Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99. 
     12.  15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). 
 13.  Chaffee, supra note 1, at 1423–27. 
 14. Id. at 1427. 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a). 
 16. Chaffee, supra note 1, at 1433–35. 
 17. Id. at 1435–56. 
 18. Id. at 1435–39. 
238 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 234 (2017) 
 
 
regulate,19 would implicate federalism and separation of power 
concerns;20 and that applying securities regulation to these 
transactions would hinder creativity within this burgeoning 
space.21 
My response to Professor Chaffee’s article focuses on the last 
of these contributions. In short, I propose a reframing of the 
Howey test and the context clause as a response to the risk of 
regulatory arbitrage. Drawing therefrom, I argue that, rather 
than excluding virtual transactions based on virtual activity from 
securities regulation altogether, these transactions should be 
subject to a new exemption from registration requirements but 
not from securities fraud prohibitions. 
II. Reframing the Howey Test and the Context Clause as a 
Response to the Risk of Regulatory Arbitrage 
I propose a new way of looking at the interaction of the 
Howey test for “investment contracts” and the prefatory context 
clause: as a response to the risk of regulatory arbitrage. 
A. Risk of Regulatory Arbitrage in the Context of Securities 
Regulatory arbitrage “exploits the gap between the economic 
substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment, 
taking advantage of the legal system’s intrinsically limited ability 
to attach formal labels that track the economics of transactions 
with sufficient precision.”22 As explained by Victor Fleischer, 
when parties engage in regulatory arbitrage, they may select 
structures that increase transaction costs but decrease regulatory 
costs, thus “leading to results that are inefficient in the short run 
                                                                                                     
 19. Id. at 1440. 
 20.  Id. at 1439–44. 
 21.  Id. at 1444–48. 
 22. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010). 
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and indeterminate in the long run.”23 Moreover, to the extent that 
parties engaging in regulatory arbitrage are able to avoid 
regulation that seeks to further certain policy goals, those policy 
goals are undercut.  
Broadly speaking, securities regulation furthers two general 
policy goals when applied to transactions: ensuring that investors 
have sufficient information when making investment decisions 
and deterring fraud.24 The requirement that securities offerings 
either be registered or exempt from registration25 furthers the 
former purpose, and the securities fraud prohibitions,26 including 
private rights of action, further the latter.  
Not surprisingly, compliance with the securities laws is 
costly, which motivates parties to structure transactions in order 
to avoid application of the securities laws. As a recent example, 
initial coin offerings, to the extent that they are structured in an 
attempt to avoid application of the securities laws, demonstrate 
the incentive for regulatory arbitrage in the context of 
securities.27 
                                                                                                     
 23. Id. at 275. 
 24. See Marc I. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and 
the Definition of “Security”: The “Context” Claus, “Investment Contract” Analysis, 
and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L. REV. 489, 512 (1987) (“The Acts have at 
least a dual function: to provide an adequate and accurate informational flow to 
the investing public and to ensure a measure of integrity and protection against 
abuse in the marketplace.”). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 77e. 
 26.  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 27.  See SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and 
Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-
11#_ftnref5 (“Following the issuance of the 21(a) Report, certain market 
professionals have attempted to highlight utility characteristics of their 
proposed initial coin offerings in an effort to claim that their proposed tokens or 
coins are not securities.”); see also Securities and Exchange Commission, Report 
of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934: The DAO, S.E.C. Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter “The 
21(a) Report”] (analyzing whether the sale of particular tokens by a 
decentralized autonomous organization are within the scope of the securities 
laws). 
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B. The Howey Test as a Broad Rule to Prevent Regulatory 
Arbitrage 
One way of preventing regulatory arbitrage is to adopt broad 
rules that are “not targeted at a specific deal structure or type of 
investment,” thus limiting the opportunity to structure a 
transaction in a way to avoid regulatory coverage.28 As an 
example of such a broad rule, Professor Fleischer cites Section 
469 of the Tax Code,29 which “targets all passive-activity losses, 
however generated” and thus decreases the ability to exploit tax 
shelters.30 
The securities laws apply only to transactions in “securities,” 
which are defined with a laundry list that includes specific types 
of securities like “notes” and “stock.”31 If the list were limited to 
these specific types, there would be a significant opportunity to 
structure transactions to avoid the securities laws. The definition 
of “security” also includes a catch-all, however—the 
aforementioned “investment contract.”32 As defined by the 
Supreme Court in Howey, an investment contract is “a contract, 
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a 
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the 
efforts of the promoter or a third party.”33 These elements 
together represent the types of interests, no matter how 
structured, that merit regulation under the securities laws.34 The 
premise of this definition of “investment contract” is that the 
policy goals of ensuring disclosure and preventing fraud are 
implicated when people make investments (contribute money 
with the goal of profiting) in a pooled transaction in which the 
                                                                                                     
 28.  Fleischer, supra note 22, at 255. 
 29. 26 U.S.C. § 469. 
 30.  Fleischer, supra note 22, at 255. 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). 
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). 
 33. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99. 
 34. See id. at 298 (“Form was disregarded for substance and emphasis was 
placed upon economic reality.”). 
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investors are largely passive (and thus unable to protect 
themselves to the same degree as if they were active participants 
in the venture).35  
In other words, the broad definition of “investment contract” 
prevents regulatory arbitrage. Indeed, the Supreme Court in 
Howey emphasized this rationale for defining investment 
contracts broadly: “It embodies a flexible rather than a static 
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless 
and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the 
money of others on the promise of profits.”36 In addition, this 
rationale is consistent with Congress’s intent to apply the 
securities laws to “the many types of instruments that in our 
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.”37 
For this reason, although I agree with Professor Chaffee that, in 
1933 and 1934, Congress did not anticipate that the securities 
laws would to apply to transactions without a substantial link to 
the real world,38 I disagree that Congress did not intend for the 
securities laws to be responsive to changing technology, including 
the potential application to virtual transactions based on virtual 
activity. Likewise, because Congress intended the category of 
“investment contracts” to operate as a catch-all, I disagree with 
                                                                                                     
 35.  See Jonathan M. Sobel, A Rose May Not Always Be A Rose: Some 
General Partnership Interests Should Be Deemed Securities Under the Federal 
Securities Acts, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1313, 1316 (1994) (“The Howey test 
attempts to distinguish passive investors from those able to protect their own 
investments.  These latter investors are generally thought not to need the 
protection of the securities acts.”). 
 36.  Howey, 328 U.S. at 299; accord S.E.C. v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943)  
However, the reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and 
commonplace. Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they 
appear to be, are also reached if it be proved as matter of fact that 
they were widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing 
which established their character in commerce as “investment 
contracts, ” or as ‘any interest or instrument commonly known as a 
“security.” 
 37.  Howey, 328 U.S. at 229 (quoting H. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong. 1st Sess., 
p.11). 
 38.  See Chaffee, supra note 1, at 1435-39. 
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Professor Chaffee that it implicates federalism or separation of 
powers concerns for it to do just that. 
And the broad definition of “investment contract” has been 
effective in preventing regulatory arbitrage. As a recent example, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission interpreted particular 
tokens sold by a decentralized autonomous organization to be 
investment contracts and thus subject to the securities laws.39 As 
explained by S.E.C. Chair Jay Clayton in a recent public 
statement, “replacing a traditional corporate interest recorded in 
a central ledger with an enterprise interest recorded through a 
blockchain entry on a distributed ledger may change the form of 
the transaction, but it does not change the substance.”40 
C. The Context Clause as a Release Valve When There Is Not an 
Arbitrage Risk 
And yet, by using a broad rule to prevent regulatory 
arbitrage, there is also a risk that the rule will bring transactions 
within the scope of regulation even if they do not pose an 
arbitrage risk. Therefore, it is helpful to include a release valve 
that excludes those transactions that do not pose such a risk, lest 
those transactions be burdened unnecessarily. I argue that the 
context clause interacts with the definition of “investment 
contract” in this way. In other words, rather than Professor 
Chaffee’s interpretation of the context clause as an invitation to 
analyze whether “the surrounding conditions of the thing that 
might be a security dictate that it not be covered by the federal 
securities law,”41 I contend that the context clause should apply 
only to those situations in which the definition of investment 
contract reaches too broadly and sweeps in transactions that do 
not pose a risk of regulatory arbitrage. 
                                                                                                     
 39.  See Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of Investigation 
Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, 
S.E.C. Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017). 
 40. Supra note 27. 
 41. Chaffee, supra note 1, at 1435. 
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As accurately explained by Professor Chaffee, the Supreme 
Court has not provided explicit guidance about the scope of the 
context clause.42 While aspects of the Court’s seminal context 
clause opinion, Marine Bank v. Weaver,43 have been aptly 
criticized as “the product of hopelessly circular logic”44 and as 
“bristl[ing] with analytical deficiencies,”45 I contend that the 
Court’s application of the context clause in Weaver is consistent 
with its role as a release valve when there is not a risk of 
regulatory arbitrage. 
In Weaver, the Court explicitly applied the context clause to 
exclude a certificate of deposit issued by a federally regulated 
bank from the scope of the securities laws46 and implicitly applied 
it to exclude a unique profit-sharing agreement between two 
families.47 Both scenarios are consistent with my conception of 
using the context clause to exclude transactions that do not pose 
a risk of regulatory arbitrage. 
First, the certificate of deposit did not pose a risk of 
regulatory arbitrage because it was already “subject to the 
comprehensive set of regulations governing the banking 
industry,”48 which is comparably robust to the regulations 
governing securities. The reporting, inspection, and advertising 
rules that apply to federally regulated banks arguably serve as a 
substitute for the registration and reporting rules that apply to 
securities,49 and FDIC insurance arguably serves as a substitute 
                                                                                                     
 42.  See id. at 1434 (“[O]ne starts with a relatively blank slate in 
determining whether the ‘unless the context otherwise requires’ language 
excludes securities entirely within virtual space from coverage by federal 
securities law.”). 
 43.  Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982). 
 44.  Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 24, at 521. 
 45.  Gary P. Bunch, Marine Bank v. Weaver: What is a Security?, 34 
MERCER L. REV. 1017, 1042 (1983). 
 46.  Weaver, 455 U.S. at 559. 
 47.  Id. at 560; see Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 24, at 507 
(recognizing the “Court’s implicit application of the ‘context’ clause to preclude 
the Weaver profit-sharing agreement”). 
 48.  Weaver, 455 U.S. at 558. 
 49.  Id.; Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 24, at 514. 
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for the securities acts’ antifraud rules.50 Therefore, it is unlikely 
that transactions would be restructured to take advantage of 
banking regulation and avoid securities regulation. 
This is admittedly a re-framing of the Court’s reasoning in 
Weaver, which focused on the specific risk of investor harm51 
rather than the general risk of regulatory arbitrage. But this 
interpretation of Weaver is responsive to the legitimate critique 
that “FDIC protection is not analogous to the availability of a 
private right of action under the securities laws: the former 
insures against loss, but the latter serves as both a deterrent and 
a remedy in proper circumstances.”52 If Weaver is interpreted as 
an assessment of the risk of regulatory arbitrage, the 
comparability of the specific antifraud protections afforded 
investors under the two regulatory schemes is less important 
than an assessment of the general risk of incentivizing parties to 
restructure transactions to avoid the securities laws. 
Second, the profit-sharing agreement between two families in 
Weaver did not pose a risk of regulatory arbitrage because of its 
unique nature, which is unlikely to be duplicated by other parties 
in an effort to evade the securities laws. The agreement at issue 
was between the Piccirillo family and the Weaver family. The 
Weavers agreed to guarantee a bank loan to a slaughterhouse 
and retail meat business owned by the Piccirillos.53 In return, the 
Piccirillos granted the Weavers 50% of the business’s net profits, 
$100 per month, usage of the business’s barn and pasture, and 
the right to veto future borrowing by the business.54 Because this 
was a “unique agreement, negotiated one-on-one by the parties,”55 
it did not pose a risk of regulatory arbitrage; indeed, it is unlikely 
                                                                                                     
 50. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 558; Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 24, at 514. 
 51. See Weaver, 455 U.S. at 559 (“It is unnecessary to subject issuers of 
bank certificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are 
abundantly protected under the federal banking laws.”). 
 52.  Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 24, at 515. 
 53.  Weaver, 455 U.S. at 553. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 560. 
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that parties would introduce barn-sharing into their transactions 
in order to evade the securities laws. 
While this is admittedly a re-focusing of the Court’s 
reasoning in Weaver, which centered on whether the Piccirollos 
treated the agreement as a security (such as by distributing a 
prospectus)56 rather than on whether it posed the risk of 
regulatory arbitrage. But this interpretation of Weaver is 
responsive to the legitimate critique that the Court’s reasoning is 
“hopelessly circular”: “[I]f a prospectus is required only upon first 
determining that a security is involved, how can ‘security’ be 
defined in terms of whether a prospectus is distributed?”57 If 
Weaver is interpreted as an assessment of the risk of regulatory 
arbitrage, the parties’ anticipation of the potential applicability of 
the securities laws is relevant. 
Therefore, I argue that the context clause should be 
interpreted as providing a release valve for transactions that do 
not pose a risk of regulatory arbitrage. Weaver exemplifies two 
situations in which it is unlikely that parties would adopt certain 
structures in an effort to evade the securities laws: (1) where 
another comprehensive regulatory scheme would apply to the 
transaction even if the securities laws do not; and (2) where the 
transaction is of such a unique nature that it is unlikely to be 
duplicated or scaled. 
III. The Risk of Regulatory Arbitrage in Virtual Space 
Drawing from this conception—that the definition of 
“investment contract” and the context clause work together to 
reduce the risk of regulatory arbitrage—the question presented 
by virtual transactions based on virtual reality is whether they 
pose a risk of regulatory arbitrage. I agree with Professor Chaffee 
that these transactions likely fall within the broad definition of 
                                                                                                     
 56.  See id. (“[T]he Piccirillos distributed no prospectus to the Weavers or to 
other potential investors, and the unique agreement they negotiated was not 
designed to be traded publicly.”). 
 57.  Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 24, at 521. 
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“investment contract.” But, I contend that they should be 
excluded by the context clause only if they do not pose a risk of 
regulatory arbitrage. 
The risk of regulatory arbitrage is reduced if the transactions 
are subject to another comprehensive body of law (like federal 
banking regulations) that, although not mimicking the securities 
laws, responds to the central securities laws concerns of ensuring 
disclosure and prohibiting fraud. Although Professor Chaffee 
notes that criminal wire fraud provisions would likely apply to 
virtual transactions based on virtual activity,58 which is 
responsive to some degree to the antifraud aspect of the securities 
laws, no other body of law imposes disclosure requirements akin 
to those imposed by the securities laws. Therefore, the presence 
of another body of comprehensive regulation does not limit the 
risk of regulatory arbitrage for these virtual transactions. 
The risk of regulatory arbitrage is also reduced if the 
transactions are unlikely to be viable alternatives to traditional 
securities (such as a profit-sharing agreement between families 
that includes access to a barn and pasture). If virtual 
transactions based on virtual activity were limited to a relatively 
circumscribed world, perhaps they could be analogized to the 
profit-sharing agreement in Weaver. But, as Professor Chaffee 
notes, “[v]irtual space existing within video games, virtual 
worlds, virtual reality, and augmented reality has become a 
regular part of most peoples’ lives.”59 Therefore, I believe that 
excluding these virtual transactions from the scope of the 
securities laws poses the risk of funneling transactions to this 
platform and undercutting the goals of the securities laws. 
Therefore, I argue that virtual transactions based on virtual 
reality, to the extent they fall within the definition of “investment 
contracts,” should be treated as securities. In response to 
Professor Chaffee’s legitimate concern about hindering creativity 
in this burgeoning area, I believe that the better response is to 
enact a new exemption from registration that is responsive to the 
                                                                                                     
 58. Chaffee, supra note 1, at 1452. 
 59. Id. at 1455. 
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unique considerations that arise in virtual space. Like the federal 
crowdfunding exemption,60 which seeks to adapt the securities 
laws to a “relatively new and evolving method of using the 
Internet to raise capital to support a wide range of ideas and 
ventures,”61 this new exemption could seek to further the policy 
goals of the securities laws while not stifling innovation in virtual 
space. This proposed solution would depend on Congress’s 
possessing the political will to act. Yet, if courts and regulators 
consistently apply the securities laws to those virtual 
transactions that qualify as investment contracts,62 and if that 
application unduly inhibits creativity, Congress may be 
motivated to respond, as it did in the context of crowdfunding.  
In conclusion, I applaud Professor Chaffee for his article’s 
unique contributions in an emerging area, and I welcome an 
ongoing scholarly discussion about the role of the context clause 
as applied to “investment contracts” and about the application of 
that clause in innovative spaces, including virtual transactions 
based on virtual activity. 
                                                                                                     
 60.  17 C.F.R. § 227.100 et seq.; Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Crowdfunding, S.E.C. Release No. 9974, 2015 WL 7273273, at *3 (Oct. 30, 2015)  
Regulation Crowdfunding, among other things, permits 
individuals to invest in securities-based crowdfunding 
transactions subject to certain thresholds, limits the amount of 
money an issuer can raise under the crowdfunding exemption, 
requires issuers to disclose certain information about their 
offers, and creates a regulatory framework for the 
intermediaries that facilitate the crowdfunding transactions. 
 61.  Securities and Exchange Commission, Crowdfunding, S.E.C. Release 
No. 9974, 2015 WL 7273273, at *4 (Oct. 30, 2015). 
 62.  See S.E.C. v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 44 & 55 (1st Cir. 2001) (reversing 
dismissal of the SEC’s complaint because, as alleged, the “virtual shares in an 
enterprise existing only in cyberspace” satisfied the Howey test). 
